ENDNOTES
24
Wright v. Creative Corp., 498 P.2d 1179 (holding that alleged
defective construction of sliding glass door does not provide
basis for strict liability claim); McClanahan v. GiLconite, 494
F.Supp. 1334 (D. Cob. 1980) (concluding that alleged defective
construction of oil refinery does not provide basis for strict
product liability daim).
25 Anderson
v. M. W. Kellogg Co., 766 P.2d 637 (Cob. 1988) (holding that
because industrial conveyor belt system is an improvement to
real property plaintifrs claims, including strict liability,
are barred by statute of repose for person- al inury caused by
new manufacturing equipment); Tw Denver Highlands Ltd. Partnership
v. Diliingham Const. NA, Inc., 932 P.2d 827 (Cob. App. 1996)
(hold- ing that supplier and installer of con- crete for parking
garage was not a matenalman who supplied a defective product,
but rather, a contractor whose work related to building a structure,
so action is barred by statute of repose); Embree v. American
Continental Corp., 684 P.2d 951 (Cob. App. 1984) (concluding
that lot grading is part of improvements to real property so
action is barred).
26 nright
v. City of Colorado Springs, 716 P.2d 148 (Cob. App. 1985) (noting
that vestibule attached to airport terminal is improvement to
real property because owner intended to provide permanent relief
from high winds).
27 Anderson
v. MW. Kellogg, Co.,766 P.2d 637 (Cob. 1988).
28 The
Cl conveyor at issue, was an outdoor incline conveyor that connected
two buildings and transported clay. Id. at 645-46.
29 Ennght
v. City of Colorado Springs, 716 P.2d148 (Cob. App. 1985).
30 CR5.
~l3-80-127.
31 Wright
v. Creative Corp., 30 Cob. App.575, 498 P.2d 1179 (1972).
32 Menendez
v. Paddock Pool Const. Co., 836 P.2d 968 (Art. App. 1991) (concluding
that a swimming pool was not a product for purposes of strict
products liability claim). See also Chicago Heights Venture v.
Dynamit Nobel of America, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 214, 217-1 18 (ND.
Ill.1983) (policy reasons underlying strict products liability
did not lustily imposition of such liability on roofing material
manufacturer, especially where other judicial remedies were available);
Moore v. jesco. Inc., 531 So.2d 815, 817 (Miss. 1988) (alleged
manufacture of defective components used in construction of chicken
houses did not give rise to strict liability in tort); Smith
v. Fluor Corp., 514 So.2d 1227 (Miss. 1987) (manufacturer of
heat exchanger installed in refinery not subject to product defect
claim because heat exchanger was an improvement to real property,
not a product); Heller v. Cad ral Corp., 406 N.E.2d 88 (III.
App. 1980) (noting that condominium and component parts therefore
were not a product for purposes of imposing strict liability).
33 McClanahan
v. American Gilsonite Co., 494 F. Supp. 1334, 1348 (D. Cob. 1980)
34 Id.
35 Simon
v. Coppola, 876 P. 2d 10 (Colo. App. 1993)
36 See
Fenton v. Fibreboard Corp., 827 P.2d 564 (Cob. App. 1991) (holding
that trial court properly found that insulation product containing
asbestos was a Door Corp., 707 P.2d 1027 (Cob. App. 1985) (holding
that trial court erred in excluding evidence that was probative
of garage door manufacturer's preaccident knowledge of danger
inherent in product that pinned child, causing permanent injuries);
Perlmutter v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 4 F.3d 864 (D. Cob. 1993) (applying
Colorado law and concluding that developers of shopping mall
had failed to establish that acoustical filter containing asbestos
was a defective product).
37 See,
e.g., Philadelphia Nat. Bank v. Dow Chemical Co., 605 F. Supp.
60, 62-63 (ED. Pa. 1985) (allowing strict product liability claim
involving manufacturer's mortar additive in commercial bank building);
Duggan v. Hallmark Pool Mfg.Co. Inc., 398 N.W.2d 175, 178 (Iowa
1986) (noting that designer and manufacturer of prefabricated
swimming pool was deemed a manufacturer despite defendant's claims
to the contrary, because defendant held itself out as such);
Patitucci v. Drelich, 379 A.2d 297, (N.J. Super. 1977) (allowing
strict liability claim based on the failure of a packaged sewage
system assembled and installed underground and connected to a
house); Bednarski v. Hideout Homes & Realty, Inc., 711 F.
Supp. 823, 825-27 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (allowing strict products liability
claim against a builder for a defective electrical outlet in
residential house); Bastian v. Wausau Homes, Inc., 620 F. Supp.
947, 949-50 (N.D. 111. 1985) (defective electric baseboard heater
in prefabricated factory-built home); Kaneko v. Kilo Coast Processing,
654 P.2d 343, 350 (Hawaii 1982) (conduding that pre-fabricated
building that must be assembled is a product for purposes of
strict products liability). See also Annotation, Recovery, Under
Strict Liability in Tort, For injury Or Damage Caused By Defects
In Building Or Land," A.L.R.4th 351 (citing Colorado cases
for the proposition that recovery is not allowed under a theory
of strict liability in tort, based upon general policy considerations,
for injury caused by defects in building or band").
38 Schipperv.
Levitt & Sons, Inc., 207 A.2d 314 (N.J. 1965).
39 Patitucci
v. Drelich, 379 A.2d 297 (N.J. Super. 1977).
40 La
Crosse v. Schubert, Schroeder & Associates, Inc., 240 N.W.2d
124 (Wis.1976).
41 Kriegler
v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal.App.2d 224 (1st Dist. 1969).
42 Hyman
v. Gordon, 35 Cal.App.3d 769 (2d Dist. 1973).
43 O'Laughlin
v. Minnesota Natural Gas Co., 253 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1977)
44 Del
Mar Beach Club Owners Association v. Imperial Contracting Co.,
123 Cal.App.3d 898(4th Dist. 1981).
45 See
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
In Greenman, Justice Traynor stated the reasoning behind strict
liability as follows:
The purpose of such (strict)
liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from
defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such
products on the market rather than by the injured persons who
are powerless to protect themselves.
